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PRICE VERSUS QUANT~Y: MARKET
CLEARING MECHANISMS WHEN
SELLERS DIFFER IN QUALITY
ABSTRACT
High-quality producers in a vertically differentiated market can reap superior profits by
charging higher prices, selling greater quantities, or both. If qualities are known by consumers and
production costs are constant, then having a higher quality secures the producer both higher price
and higher quantity; if marginal costs are rising, having a higher quality assures only higher price.
If only some consumers can discern quality but others cannot, then high- and low-quality producers
may set a common price, but the high-quality producer will sell more. In this context, quality begets
quantity. Empirical analyses suggest that in both the mutual fund and automobile industries, high-
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You need an electrician. If you Me fortunate, you are a well-informed consumer and you
know who is good, and who is not. A less-informed consumer, perhaps with no recourse
beyond the Yellow Pages, is more likely to end up with a low-quality electrician.
Markets of this type are common. They are found with professionals such as caterers,
doctors, and movers, with services such as mutual funds, airlines, and resorts, and with
consumer durables such as automobiles, dishwashers and VCRs. Though quality differs
significant ly among providers, many consumers do not know which ones are of high quality.
In such markets, casual observation suggests, suppliers whose qualities differ may charge
similm prices; that is, firms compete on quality within a tight price range. For example,
numerous magazine and newspaper articles analyze the quality of similmly-priced goods
such as “n~load” mutual funds and “economy” cars; if some goods are found to have higher
quality by many sources, would their producers earn their superior rents by raising prices
or by selling more units? In both the mutual fund and automobile industries, the latter
mechanism seems to apply: the quantity sold by a firm is positively related to its product’s
perceived quality, while the price markup over cost has little or no relat ionship with quality. 1
We refer to this phenomenon as “quantity clearing the market”.2
In this paper, we =k: “Under what conditions would a ‘high-quality’ producer choose to
reap its rents through greater quantity rather than higher price?” We focus on a duopoly
where the sellers differ in quality. 3 Markets where products differ in characteristics that can
be strictly ordered in terms of desirability are called vertically differentiated markets. We
use this bamework to study the role of costs and imperfect information on
shares, and we identify subtle and powerful mechanisms that allow different
relative market
quantities sold,
1 See section 5.
2 This idea was inspired by the experience of prof-ional bridge players, who are hired by customers to
play on teams in tournaments. Casual observation suggests that prices per tournament tend to be close
across quality levels, but that the top profmsionals tend to have jobs for a subst ant ially greater proportion
of tournaments than their lower-ranked brethren, Thus, the rents to quality are raped primarily through
the mechanism of quantity, not price.
3 Market outcomes with many sellers are discused in the Appendix.
1rather than different prices, to be the primmy mechanism that clears the market.4
The notion that product dtierentiation can soften price competition has a long and
distinguished history. Chamberlain (1933) first suggested a model of product differentiation
as a means to avoid Bertrand’s (1883) zero-profit duopoly result and to more realistically
model monopolist ic competition. For almost 50 years after that, the focus was on horizontal
dfierentiation, with “location” the best-studied example. In the late 1970s and early 1980s,
several economists began to study vertically differentiated markets, The early literature on
this subject focused on the properties of equilibria and tried to find general conditions under
which such industries would have a limited number of firms in equilibrium.5 Researchers
subsequent ly combined models of vertical and horizontal different iation to study a range of
topics.6 However, there has been relatively little work on the relationship between quality
and market share, because even simple models can yield conflicting answers. 7 In this paper,
we make no claims of having rmolved these conflicts; rather, we aim to identify the strategic
incentives that can lead to large differences in quantities in the presence of small (or no)
differences in prices.
Section 2 presents our basic model of a vertically differentiated duopoly with perfect
information and no costs of production, a setup similm to that chosen by earlier authors.
Section 3 extends the model to allow for convex costs. We find that the relationships among
qualities and quantities found in a model without costs no longer apply when costs are
included.
Section 4 presents the main result of the paper. Here, we add a class of imperfectly
informed consumers to the zero-cost model of section 2. We find that under some reasonable
4 In our paper, quantity means “actual quantity sold”. Thus, we are not pr=enting a model of equilibrium
queue and explaining why some r=taurants, movie, etc. have persistent exe- demand. This famous
problem is outside our current scope, See Becker (1991) for a model of this phenomenon.
5 See Gabszewicz and Thiwe (1979, 1980), Shaked and Sutton (1982, 1983), and Sutton (1986). Tirole
(1988) provid= a helpful overview of the main results on such markets.
6 For examplm of this more recent work see Motta (1993), Hackner (1994), Rosenkranz (1995), and Boom
(1995).
7 Sutton (1986) points out that the literature on vertical differentiation can give no general r=ults about
the relationship between quality and market share. one attempt to focus on this relationship is Gabszewicz
et. al (1981), but their r=ults are for a specific type of consumer utility function. Rosen (1981) studies the
“superstar” phenomenon. Many of his insights are also applicable to our problem, although his superstars
tend to supply higher quantitie and charge higher prices.
2conditions, both firms would prefer to post the same price (pooling) rather than post different
prices (separating). Compared tot he separating equilibrium, pooling reduces both efficiency
and the total number of consumers who are served; the imperfect information allows the firms
to relax their price competition in a tacit but effective manner, leading to an equilibrium in
which the two firms may serve significantly dflerent numbers of consumers.
Section 5 presents two empirical studies that address the relationships among quantity,
price markups, and quality in the mutual fund and automobile industries, and find results
consistent with the model of section 4, Section 6 concludes. An Appendix provides detailed
solutions for the models studied in sections 3 and 4, as well as a many-firm extension of the
model presented in section 2.8
2. A Basic Model of Vertically Differentiated Duopoly
Our basic model assumes that there are no costs of production and that both consumers
and producers have perfect information. We work in a partial equilibrium framework, fo-
cusing on a single consumption good, There are two producers of this good, indexed by
m: a high-quality producer, m = H, with quality dH, and a low-quality producer, m = L,
with quality d~. We assume that O < OL < OH < 1, and we define a as the ratio between
the qualities of L and H: a = &, hence O < a < 1. For semantic ease, we will use female
pronouns for H and male pronouns for L. In equilibrium, our producers will earn profits,
but entry will not occur because (by assumption) our industry is made up of producers with
scarce skills, which can earn rents. For example, high-quality electricians, mutual funds, and
automobile producers earn rents, and these rents will not be dissipated by entry as long as
the underlying high capability cannot quickly be reproduced. When quality takes the form
of an innate talent or a skill that is difficult to acquire, then this assumption is reasonable.g
Once we can safely ignore entry, our task is to model the market for different fixed numbers
of producers. Duopoly is the logical first step. The Appendix sketches the solution to the
model with multiple firms, and gives an illustration for a special case of a 5-firm industry.
8 Solutions for a model in which duopolists set pric~ simultaneously and for a model in which the low-
quality seller sets price first are available from the authors.
9 Even for manufactured goods lihe automobil~, quality may be impossible to reproduce in the short run,
and very costly to reproduce in the long run.
3Let a consumer’s “valuation” for the consumption good be denoted by u. Each consumer
can buy either zero or one unit of the good. There is a continuum of consumers, indexed
by their valuation, v, on the interval [0, I]. The benefit to a consumer from purchasing one
unit from producer m is vO~; the cost is the price, Pm. Thus, the specific realization of the
utility function is
u(e, v) = Vom – Pm
if the consumer buys one unit of the good from producer m, and
(1)
U(e, v) = o (2)
otherwise. We assume that consumers always have enough money to buy one unit of the
good if it is optimal to do so. We also assume that when a consumer is indifferent betwwn
buying and not buying, he buys, and when he is indifferent between buying the two types of
goods, he buys horn H. The utility function used here is similar to the one chosen by earlier
writers on vertical different iation. 10 If there were only one quality available, then this model
of consumption would imply a linear market demand curve where the fraction of consumers
willing to buy a good of quality Omat any price P would be equal to 1 – ~.
The sequence of events is
(1) H chooses her price, PH.
(2) L chooses his price, PL.
(3) Each consumer can: (A) purchase one unit horn H, (B) purchase one unit from L, or
(C) make no purchase.
This sequential price-setting rule differs from the rule used in most of the previous liter-
ature on vertical differentiation, where firms generally set prices simult anmusly. We have
H set her price first because it is the simplest way to model imperfect information (which
we do in section 4). For now, we still assume that consumers can costlessly determine the
quality of both producers.
10 See Gabszewicz and Thisse (1979, 1980) and Shaked and Sutton (1982, 1983). To generate the market
segmentation between dfierent qualitim, the utility functions used by these authors use different= in income
rather than differences in valuations. In fact, the two approach= are isomorphic.
4We solve the game backwards to find the equilibrium level of prices, quantities, and
purchase decisions. First, a consumer will
A) buy the high-quality good if
(1) vo~ – P~ > ve~ – P~ + u > ~:::
and
(2)voH– PH20+v2~;
B) buy the low-quality good if
(1) vo~ – P~ > vo~ – P~ + v < ~:::
and
(2)vO~–P~~O+v>~;and
C) otherwise, a consumer will not buy.
We next turn to L’s price-setting problem. L knows the distribution of consumers and
their opt imal conditions. Production is costless. 11 The sellers maximize
absent costs is simply price times quantity. Thus, L seeks to maximize
TL = QLPL,
where QL is L’s quantity. Using conditions B. 1 and B.2, we can see that
this producer will be
Therefore, L’s profit function can be written as
(
PH – PL PL) — l’L. ‘L= %~–OL–OL







11 This no-cost assumption is a normalization, and all the r=ults of this section would be identical if we
used a constant marginal-cost production function as long w the continuum of consumer valuations had
some mass above the level of marginal costs.





So L’s price will always be proportional to H’s price, with a proportion equal to &, one-half
the ratio between the two quality levels.
Finally, we turn to H’s price-setting problem. From (7) it can be verified that ~:~ > ~
for all optimal choices of PL by L. Thus, for any level of P~ that could be set in equilibrium,
( )
QH= I–:”: . (8)
Replacing PL by its optimal value, we can write H’s profits as
H seeks to muimize these profits with respect to PH. Solving for the optimal PH yields
p“ =
6H (6” – e~)
29” – eL, “
(lo)
Finally, we substitute (10) into (7) to obtain
eL(8”– @L)
PL=
2(20” – 6L) “
(11)
Figure 1 plots PH and PL against 6L for the case of d“ = 1. At 8L = O, H effectively
possesses a monopoly, and thus sets the monopoly price, PH = .5. As OL rises, H faces
increming competition, and her optimal price falls. Two counteracting factors affect the
level of PL as @L rises: first, increases in 6L raise the ratio of equilibrium prices ~; second,
increases in dL cause PH to fall. As long as PH is high enough, the first effect dominates,
and PL increases with f3~. When PH falls low enough so that increases in the ratio are not
sufficient to offset decre~es in the level of PH, the second effect dominates, and PL decreases
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Notes: PH and PL are the prices for H and L, respectively, @L is L’s quality. The price curves are drawn for the
C- Of OH = 1.






Figure 2 plots equilibrium profits against d~ for the cme of 6H = 1. As expected, ~H falls
monotonically with OLas H faces greater and greater competition. The relationship of x~ and
0~ is more interesting, and is similar to the relationship of PL and 0~. At first, m~ increases
with 0~, as L is able to charge higher prices without losing market share. Eventually, as L’s
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Notes: TH and TL are profits for H and L, respectively. @L is L’s quality. The profit curves are drawn for the case
ofe~ = 1.
quality closes in on H’s, the price competition becomes so intense that PH and PL both fall
to low levels, making n~ diminish. As 6L + 1 = 19~, prices and profits go to zero for both
firms.
A major focus of this paper is the relative market shares of high- and low-quality sellers.









Many of our results can be expressed in terms of ~, the ratio between the two qualities.








Thus, (16) reveals that the ratio of L’s and H’s market sh~es is a function of the ratio
of their qualities, with an upper bound of 1 (when a = 1) and a lower bound of ~ (when
a = O). Two main results follow directly from (16).
Result 1: H always has a greater market share than L: r <1, VQ.
Result 2: The ratio of the market shares increases with the ratio of the qualities: ~ =
& >0.
These two results serve as simple benchmarks for the analyses that follow.
3. Convex Costs of Production
We now bring costs into the basic model, employing a simple formulation for the cost
function, F (Q~), of
F(Qm) = ~,
which implies muginal costs for each firm of
(17)
F’(Qm) = cQm. (18)
A price-taking firm with this total cost function would have a linear supply curve with
slope = c. Overall, a market composed of a fixed number of such firms with some quality
level d~ and the continuum of consumers with the preferences given in section 2 would
generate linear supply and demand curves. 12
The inclusion of costs does not alter the consumers’ problem; their optimal decision rules
are the same as in section 2. As before, H sets her price first by m=imizing
12 Solutions to a model with difFerent marginal costs for each firm and to a model with linear total costs
are available from the authors. Rmults for these models are qualitatively similar to those d=cribed in this
section.
97r~=(l– ::;)PH
and then L sets his price by maximizing
(













We solve this game backwards to obtain equilibrium levels
function of the parameters. A bit of algebra reveals that
(19)
(20)
for prices and quantities as a
f?L(26L0&0 – zd~e~+ C8~ – C6~ + 2c.9Lf?H+ C2@H) 13
r = 46~0~ + 20~ – 60~0~ + 4c@Ld~ – 3C@~@~ + C26& “
The main results here can be stated analogously to those of section 2.
(21)
Result l’: L can have
@L.
Interest ingly, once we
a larger market share than H: r > 1 for some values of c, OH, and
add even a small level of convex costs, it is sometimes optimal for
H to set a high price, attract a small number of high-value customers, and let L t~e a
majority of the market. This result is depicted graphically in Figure 3, which plots r against
8L for the case where c = .1, @H = 1.
This figure demonstrates the dangers of ready conjectures about the relationship between
mmket share and quality. Even in this simple example, the high-quality producer will
sometimes sell more and sometimes less than the low-quality producer. It is important to
remember here that the consumer valuations are uniformly distributed; the result is not
driven by H’s d~ire to capture a slender tail of high-value consumers. As costs rise, both H
and L select higher prices, resulting in lower quantities, but H raises price at a faster rate.
Result 2’: The ratio of the market shares increases with ~L and decreases with OH: & >0
and &<o.
13 See the Appendix for details.
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Notes: ~ is the ratio of L’s quantity tn H’s quantity. ~L is L’s quality. The curve is drawn for the case of OH = 1.
This is analogous to Result 2 horn the previous section, although now we can no longer
express r purely in terms of a. Figure 3 shows the typical relationship:14 r st=ts off very
low when d~ is low, and then rises monotonically with ~~, passing through r = 1. That
is, the market shares of both firms are increasing in their own quality. This is a logical
comparative static r=ult to expect, but it must be considered carefully in light of Result 1’.
Together, the two results show that if a firm increases its quality, then its market share will
also increase, but the higher-quality firm will not necessarily have the great er market share.
Figure 4 plots r for the case of 19~ = 1, 19~= .5. As can be seen from the figure, r
first increases with c and then decreases. In the limit, as c goes to infinity, r converges
to a = &, which is equal to .5 in this case. Since r is a continuous function of c, it is
remnable to abstract from costs with at least some confidence that any specific solution
to the game will not be made unstable by small perturbations in costs. Nevertheless, the
14 See the Appendix for details.
11Fi~e 4- Market Share Ratio Between L and H as a Function of the
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Notes: ‘F is the ratio between L’s quantity and H’s quantity. c is the slope of the marginal cost curve. The curve is
drawn for the case of 6H = 1,
results of this section teach us to be wary of broad conjectures about the set of all equilibria
based on no-cost models. With these caveats in mind, the next section presents a model
with imperfect information and no costs of production.
4. Imperfect Information
For many goods and services, it is dficult or impossible for some consumers to know
the true quality of an item before purchase. For example, a consumer would not necessmily
be able to ~certain the quality of the wiring installed by an electrician until some time
passed after the job was completed. This section uses a very simple information structure
for consumers who are trying to distinguish between H and L; we separate consumers into
two types, connoisseurs and dilettantes. A connoisseur can always tell producers apart;
12that is, a connoisseur will always know the type of producer that he or she is buying from.
A dilettante can only tell producers apart if they are charging different prices. If the two
producers are charging the same price, then the dilettante will be unable to distinguish H
from L, at least until after the purchase. Our model allows dilettantes to deduce information
when different prices are charged since quality may be learned much more easily in markets
where prices convey information. Thus, if quality were either positively or negatively related
to price we assume that this fact would invariably be known. When prices are the same,
additional work is required to determine who is high quality and who is low. Dilettantes are
capable of restlessly using price-dependent information, such as that “the noload mutual
funds have the highest returns”, but unable (except at prohibitive cost) to use non-price-
dependent information, such as that “mutual funds that invest primarily in stocks with low
price-to-earnings ratios have the highest returns”. There is nothing about this information
structure that is inconsistent with dilettantes being rational utility maximizers, and we
model them as such.
We denote the fraction of dilettantes by A, where dilettantes are drawn uniformly from
all consumers.’5 Since connoisseurs can always tell the producers apart, the conditions for
their purchase decision are the same as in section 2. If the producers set different prices,
then dilettantes can tell them apart as well, and their purchase decisions will be the same
as those of the connoisseurs. However, if producers set the same price, then a dilettante will
have to randomly choose a producer (one-half chance of each), and will only purchase the
good if his expected utility of this random purchase is nonnegative. More formally, when
facing a single price, P, a dilettante will
(1)buy if (’~~d~) v z
(2) otherwise not buy.
P; and
When it is L’s turn to set prices, he knows that he can choose either a pooling equilibrium
15 This assumption seems most re=onable for markets such as automobil=, where both dilettante and
connoisseurs may care equally about quality f~tors like safety and reliability, even though connoisseurs
would be better informed, Neverthele~, relaxing this assumption and drawing connoisseurs more heavily
from “high v“ consumers would not qualitatively change the results.
13(same price as H), or a separating equilibrium (different price). If he chooses a separating
equilibrium, then all consumers will be able to tell the producers apart, and his profits will
be the same as they were in the model studied in section 2. Let the superscripts p and s
indicate pooling and separating, respectively. Then L’s profits are






which is the same as the solution in section 2, this time written in terms of a. A change of
variables here of
~=t?H-ti~
enables us to write our results more concisely, For example, optimal separating profits for
L will be given by
If L chooses a pooling price, PL = ~H, then his profits will be
(24)
(25)
There is no maximization here, since there is only one price, PL = PH, at which there
will be pooling. If L selects the pooling price, he will only sell to dilettantes who have a
positive expected value of purchasing the good. Half of these dilettantes (by chance) will
choose H, and half will choose L. This process will be familim to tourists who have tried to
pick a Broadway show from the listings in the New York Times.
L’s decision, then, is whether to choose the separating profits given in (24) or the pooling
profits given in (25). He will choose the separating profits, and a sepmating equilibrium will
result if m: ~ x:. This condition implies that
14p~ >
2Ap (1 + a)
(26)
a(l + a) + 4A(1 – a) “
That is, there will be a cutoff level for P~, above which L will always prefer to separate;
below the cutoff level L will prefer to pool; and at the cutoff level he will be indifferent. The
intuition for this is straightforward: L’s optimal separating price is always a proportion of
P~, so when P~ is low, L’s sepmating profits will be low as well.
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Notes: T; is L’s profit if he chooses the optimal separating price to ~L (eq. 24), T; is L’s profit if he chooses to
pool by choosing PL = PH (~. 25). The profits curves are drawn for the case ~ = .5, OH = 1 and @L = .5
(i.e. ~ = ~ = .5).
Figure 5 shows the optimal separating profits compared to pooling profits as a function
of PH for the special case of A = .5, t’H = 1 and 13~= .5 (i.e., a = ~ = .5). As PH rises,
separating profits rise monotonically, while pooling profits first rise and then fall as is typical
for a monopoly. Pooling profits reach their maximum when demand for the pooled product




15low levels of PH, L is better off pooling, because the low price set by H does not leave much
room for L to earn profits by attracting low u customers with a still lower price.
The next step is to solve for H’s optimal PH, given L’s known optimal response. H
knows that she can bring about either a pooling or separating equilibrium, depending on
her choice of PH. We find her optimal price by solving for her maximum profits in each type
of equilibrium, and then comparing the two.
To choose a separating equilibrium, H must mwimize
‘fi=(’-pH~*)pH
2Ap(l + a)
subject to PH ~
a(l + a) + 4A(1 – a)”
(27)
The constraint must be included because if H chooses a PH that is too low, then L will
choose to pool.
To attain optimal pooling profits, H must maximize
“fi=(’-’)%)pH+~( +@:T,L)pHL)pH
2Ap (1 + Q!)
subject to PH ~
a(l + a) + 4A(1 – ct!)-
(28)
The first term in the profit equation derives from the demand by connoisseurs. Since all
connoisseurs who choose to purchase the good will do so from H, the lower bound for ~’
buying high-quality goods will be ~, instead of ‘H~P~ , as it was in sections 2 and 3. The
second term comes from the demand by dilettantes. Finally, the constraint ensures that
H chooses a price low enough that L will actually choose to pool. We say that a pooling
[sepmating] equilibrium is “constrained” if H’s profits cannot be pushed higher without
inducing L to separate [pool].
If H’s separating profits (solution to (27)) are higher than her pooling profits (solution to
(28)), than she will choose the higher price in a separating equilibrium. If separating profits
are lower, then she will choose a pooling equilibrium, and quality will beget quantity.
16Proposition f: If quality levels are sufficiently close and dilettantes comprise a suficient
proportion of consumers, then only pooling equilibria will exist. Su&cient conditions here
Proof: See Appendix.
Whenever the duopolists have qualities that are relatively close, we may be confident of
pooling equilibrium. The intuition is simple: as qualities converge — as a gets higher
competition becomes more intense in the separating equilibrium as both firms set prices
a
lower, and profits fall for both. In the limit, profits will be zero, in effect due to a sequential-
choice variant of Bertrand compet ition. Thus, H has an incentive to try to reduce this
competition by avoiding the low-profit separating equilibrium. She does this by holding
prices so low that L might as well engage in a pooling equilibrium.
Graphical depictions are useful in reinforcing the intuition supporting the proposition.
Figures 6 and 7 show separating profits, mfi (Tfi when constrained) and pooling profits, m;
(TZ when constrained) as a function of ~.
In Figure 6, OL = .75, and thus a = .75 and @ = .25. This is the typical case for the
range of parameters used in Proposition 1. In both Figures 6 and 7, separating profits are
constrained afler the point of tangency between T; and m;; before that point, separating
profits are equal to m&, and after that point they are equal to r~. Pooling profits, however,
are constrained before the tangency point of nfi and n~; before that point, pooling profits
are n~, and after that point they are equal to m~. In Figure 6, this latter tangency does
not occur until A is approximately equal to 1, so pooling profits are constrained
the entire range.
In Figure 6, H’s pooling profits, Tg, become greater than separating profits
and stay greater than separating profits for the rest of the range. Therefore, only pooling
equilibria will exist for all A > .2, Strikingly, with a sufficient proportion of dilettantes, H
sets a price low enough to induce L to pool. Yet L’s market share can be very low in the
pooling equilibrium. For example, when dilettantes and connoisseurs are equal in number,
A = .5, L gets only one-qumter of the market, r = .25, as he will get one-half of the
for almost
at ~ C .2,
17.--—. —.— — —..
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Notes: The profit curvm are drawn as a function of ~ for the case of OH = 1, dL = .’75 (~ = .’7s, ~ = .25).
The equations for the curves are given in the Appendix - with the equation numbers given below. ~~ is H’s profit
when ~H is set at the opimal separating price and L choos= to separate (Eq.45). Ti is H’s profitwhenpH isset
at the optimal price that makes L indifferent between pooling and separating, and L choosm to separate (Eq. 46),
#H is H’s profit when PH is set at the optimal pooling price and L chooses to pool (Eq. 51) #~ is H’s profit
when P~ is set at the optimal price that makes L indtierent between pooling and separating, and L chooses to pool
(Eq. 52),
dilettantes, leaving all of the connoisseurs
price but sell vastly different quantities.
for H. The two producers will charge the same
The result that drives H to choose a pooling equilibrium is the intense competition that
exists betw=n the two firms as their qualities converge. With dilettantes sufficiently com-
mon, H has an opportunity to avoid this competition: by holding her price sufficiently low,
she is sometim= able to induce L to pool, and thereby pick up all the business of connois-
seurs. Although H sells at a lower price than she would in a separating equilibrium, she
secures a jar higher market share. L would be far better off at many pairs of separating
prices; however, at the price chosen by H, the b~t that L can do is to pool.
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Not=: The profit curves are drawn as a function of ~ for the c=. of OH = 1, 8L = .5 (~ = .s, ~ = .s). The
equations for the curves are given in the Appendix – with the equation numbers givenbelow. xfi is H’s profit when
PH is set at the opimal separating price and L chooses to separate (Eq, 45). fi~ is H’s profit when PH is set at the
optimal price that makes L indifferent between pooling and separating, and L chooses to separate (Eq. 46). T: is
H’s profit when PH is set at the optimal pooling price and L chooses to POO1 (Eq- 51) ~~ is H’s profit when ~L
is set at the optimal price that makes L indifferent between pooling and separating, and L chooses to pool (Eq. 52).
Figure 7 shows the necessity of the lower bound on a in Proposition 1. Here, OL = .5
(and, thus, a = ~ = .5). In this case, m~ becomes greater than n~ after about A = .9, even
though pooling profits are unconstrained and separating profits are constrained. For these
pmameter values, we see a separating equilibrium at low levels of J, a pooling equilibrium
born about .2 to .9, and then a separating equilibrium once again at the top of the range.
Surprisingly, a separating equilibrium exists when almost all the consumers are dilet-
tantes. In the figure, H’s profits in the pooling equilibrium fall faster with the proportion of
dilettantes than they do in the constrained separating equilibrium. (This can be seen in the
figure by comparing the slopes of n-j and m;.) When the proportion of dilettantes becomes
very high (A = .9 in Figure 7), it is no longer worthwhile for H to allow pooling, since she
19gets only slightly more than half the total consumers. Instead, she sets a price sufficiently
high that L does even better by separating. This outcome is not possible when the qualities
become too close, because H no longer does well enough in the separating equilibrium.
We present the analogues to Results 1 and 2 from section 2. Both follow as corollaries of
Proposition 1.
Result 1“: L can have a larger market share than H: r >1 for some values of A, 8~, and
o~
This can occur when H is at a constrained separating equilibrium. For example, in the
case of a = .5, A = 1, H will choose a separating equilibrium and will obtain only one-quarter
of the market; that is, r = 3. See the Appendix for details of this calculation.
Result 2“: The ratio of the market shares can decrease when the ratio of the qualities
increases: r (al) > r (az), az > al, for some values of A.
This will occur when an increase in a causes H to change to a pooling from a separating
equilibrium. At this point, r(a) will not be dflerentiable. One simple example of such a
change would be an increwe in a from .5 to .6 when A = 1. When a = .5, H chooses to
separate and (as in Result l“) r = 3; for a = .6, the conditions of Proposition 1 are met
and we obtain a pooling equilibrium with r = 1.
Results 1“ and 2“ are quite dfierent than Wsults 1 and 2 of section 2; allowing for
imperfect information can radically change equilibria in models of vertical differentiation.
Even our stylized type of imperfect information can provide rich results and insights into
mechanisms that allow markets to clear with sellers providing vastly dfierent quantities
than they would under perfect information.
5. Two Empirical Examples: Mutual Funds and
Automobiles
Our theory predicts that when significant numbers of consumers have difficulty discerning
quality, goods of dfierent qualities but similar production costs may be offered at the same
price in a market. The higher quality goods will sell more, since knowledgeable consumers,
20— .. .
our connoisseurs, me able to discern differences. This theory would be reinforced if we could
identify markets where goods of dflerent quality sell at the same price and the high-quality
goods sell higher quantiti~.
We examined two major U.S. industries – equity mutual funds and automobiles – and
analyzed cross-sectional relationships among proxies for price, quantity, and quality. The
results of this section provide empirical motivation and support for the model presented in
sect ion 4.
5.1 Mutual Funds
The oldest qu=tion in the academic literature on equity mutual funds, still hotly debated,
concerns the ability of funds and fund managers to earn consistent excess risk-adjusted
returns. 16 If such excess returns relative to the market are possible, then fund “quality”
would be a valuable construct; if not, then the search for quality is fruitless. In any event,
both consumers and funds pay enormous attention to performance measures and quality
rankings, 17and at least until the academic debate is settled, such ratings are likely to play a
large role in funds’ and consumers’ behavior. Therefore, we take performance measures as a
proxy for quality, be it real or imagined. Our goal is not to add anything to the debate about
the usefulness of three proxies, but simply to estimate their effects on price and quantity.
The universe of funds for our study consists of the 982 U.S. domestic diversified equity
mutual funds for which data on all the following variabla is available: 1s
Price – Mutual funds can charge a price in different ways. To assure consideration of
each possibility, we employ three dfierent proxies for price.
(A) The percentage “load”, or charge, paid to the fund. The load is calculated and paid
either on the original investment ( “front load”) or on the asset value when the investor exits
the fund ( “deferred load”). These loads may sometimes be reduced for large or long-term
investors; we use the figures published in the funds’ prospectuses.
16 See Hendricks, Patel, and Zeckhauser (1993), Brown and Goetzman (1995), and Malkiel (1995) for some
recent work on this question. Th=e excms returns may be m~ured relative to the market as a whole or
relative to the universe of mutual funds. In either case, it is the persistence and predictability of excess
ret urns that mat ters.
17 For evidence on the attention paid to performance measures, see Chevalier and Ellison (1995) and Brown,
Harlow and Starks (1996).
18 All data was obtained from the Morningstar Inc. Ascent and Principia databas~.
21(B) The mmketing/administrative ( “12 b-1”) fee paid annually by all fund investors. This
fee is capped by law at a maximum of 1 percent.
(C) The funds’ total expense ratio - total expenses divided by wsets under management.
Tot al expenses include the 12b-1 fee, but not brokerage (transaction) costs. Total expenses
sometimes include incentive bonuses to the fund’s management for meeting certain targets.
We can think of these expenses m more than simply covering basic costs.
Quantity
to April 30,
- Quantity is represented by net inflows into the fund from January 31, 1996,
1996. These inflows are calculated as
N12 = AaPril,i– Ajo~,i(l + R,), (29)
where Nli = net inflows into fund z from January 31 to April 30, 1996, Aop~il,i = total assets
under management for fund i as of April 30,1996, Aja~,i = total assets under management
for fund i as of January 31, 1996, and & = 3-month return from January 31 to April 30,
1996.19
QuccZZty- 3-year annualized return, January 31, 1993, to January 31, 1996. This is the
actual return that investors received; it is net of expenses. We discuss below the effect of
adding back expenses and using gross returns as the quality variable.
The dependent variables we explore are the load, L; the 12b-1 fee, 12bl; the expense
ratio, ER; and net inflows, N1. The three-year annualized return, R3, is an independent
variable. Table 1 summarizes the results.
Regressions 1A, lB, and lC show the results of regressing price on quality (i.e., three-year
return) for our three different price proxies. In the following discussions, “significant” always
means “statistically different from zero at the five-percent level”, unless otherwise noted. In
regression #lA, load is regressed on quality. The coefficient on quality is not significant .20
Regression lB, with the 12b-1 fee = the price vmiable, has the same result, When we use
expense ratio as the price proxy in regression 1C, we find the coefficient on quality to be
19 Note that this net inflow calculation will undermtimate “true” inflows (= puchas= - redemptions) because
any dividends paid out by the fund, and not immediately reinv~td, will appear to be an outflow in our
calculation. We cannot correct for this, unfortunately, because data on dividends (or true inflows) is not
readily available, This omission, and the bias it introduces, is discussed below. In any case, the bias should
be very small, bmause our sample period do= not include either the year-end or mid-year dividends.
20 The same r~ult occurs for front load by itself or deferred load by itself as the the price variable.
22Table 1- Cross-Sectional Relationships among Price, Quality, and Quantity Proxies in the
Market for U.S. Diversified Equity Mutual Funds
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Reg. # Dep. Var. R3 L 12bl ER Constant R2
1A L .010 - 2.11 .000
(.017)
lB 12bl -.000 - — .217 .000
(.002)
lC ER -.088 - 2.46 .233
(.005)
2 NI .148 – 4.98 .018
(.034)
3 NI .129 .016 .337 -.223 4.98 .019
(.041) (.070) (.625) (.238)
Notes: Table 1 reports the results of OLS regressions involving price, quantity, and
quality proxies. The sample for each regression includes all 982 domestic diversified equity
funds for which we could get reliable data for all included variables from Morningstar Inc.’s
databases. Column (1) gives the regression # as it is referred to in the text of the paper.
(2) gives the dependent variable for each regression. Columns (3)-(6) report the coefficients
on each included independent variable; standard errors for these estimates are given in
parentheses. NI are net inflows in the period January 31 to April ,30, 1996, in $millions
(p= 1.02,0 = 5.02); Li is the total load= front load+ deferred load (p= 2.24,0 = 2.28);
12bli is the 12b-1 (marketing/administrative) fee (p = .21,0 = .30); ER is the expense ratio
(p= 1.28, 0 = .83); R3 is the annualized return for the three years preceding January 31,
1996 (p = 13.42, a = 4.55). All units me percent unless otherwise noted. The text of the
paper discusses each of these vwiables. Column (7) reports the constant and Column (8)
reports the R2 for each regression.
23negative and significant. 21 In none of these cases is there an indication that funds with
superior three-year performances set higher prices than other funds. The results are sim-
ilm for other performance measures; for on-year, fiveyear, or ten-year annualized returns,
there is no significant relationship between price and quality for proxies (A) and (B), and
there is a significant negative relationship for proxy (C).
The results of regression 2 show a clear positive relationship between quantity and qual-
ity. The coefficient on quality is positive and signticant. The point estimate implies $9.23
million in inflows for an additional one percentage point of three-yem annualized returns.
This would seem to be economically significant as well. Similar results are found using one-,
five-, and ten-year returns as the quality variable. Our calculation of net inflows understates
true inflows (purchases less redemptions) by the amount of nonreinvmted dividends; since
such dividends are likely to be positively correlated with returns, the effect of this underes-
timate should be to bias downward the coefficient on returns; adjusting for this bias would
strengthen our results. As a further test, we reestimated regression 2 excluding all funds
that have the investment objective of “income” or “growth and income” – the objectives
most likely to have high dividends. The results were similar.
Regression 3 investigates the relationship between price and quantity. If some aspect of
quality has not been captured by our performance measures, and this quality is positively
correlated with both price and quantity, then we should be able to see evidence of this in re-
gression 3, which regresses quantity on quality and all three of our price proxies. The results
confirm the positive relationship between quantity and quality, and indicate no significant
relationship between quantity and any of the price proxies. 22
Overall, the market for diversified domestic equity mutual funds displays a positive rela-
tionship between quantity (as measured by net inflows), and quality (as measured by past
returns. ) There is no signticant positive relationship between price (as measured by several
21 The quality variableisannualizedreturns,which is net of expenses. If we add back expenses so that the
quality variable equals gross returns, we find the same results, including the significant negative coefficient
when the expense ratio is regressed on returns. We do not have data on the breakdown of these expenses
between advisory and nonadvisory expensm, but rm=rchers working with more complete data sets have
not found statistically significant positive relationships between either type of fee and gross returns, This
is particularly surprising since advisory fms for some funds are directly linked to past returns. See Malkiel
(1995).
22 This result also occurs if we include the three price proxi~ separately (results not reported here).
24proxies) and quality or price and quantity. This would certainly suggest
nant response of firms facing an increase in demand is not to raise their
to sell more of their product.
that the predomi-
prices, but rather
Similar results have been found in other studies of financial services, Tufano (1989)
finds that investment banks that create innovative products do not subsequently raise their
prices, but rather capture a larger share of the underwriting market. Gompers and Lerner
(1996) show that firm age and reputation explain large dflerences in size but only small and
economically insignificant differences in price. Finally, Hulbert (1996) finds that price and
past performance are uncorrelated for investment advisory newsletters.
5.2 Automobiles
With the automobile industry, as in the study of mutual funds, we seek only to identi&
23 We study cars from the 1994 simple relationships among prices, quantities, and quality.
model-year. The “model” is the level of a~egation used throughout. For example, our
data source listed six dfierent versions of the Ford Escort in 1994, a,s well as many option
packages that could be attached to each version. We simply consider the “Ford Escort”, 24
This aggregation is necessmy given our data constraints.
Price – Automobile sales in the United States can be
markets. First, manufacturers sell to dealers, who are by
We use the following proxies:
divided into wholesale and retail
law independent of the manufac-
turers. The price charged to dealers is the “dealer cost” of an automobile, and is publicly
available. Next, dealers sell to consumers. Manufacturer’s publish a “su~ested” price for
these retail transactions, but the majority of purchases are the result of bargaining between
dealer and consumer with a final price somewhere between the dealer cost and the manufac-
turer’s suggested retail price. One can think of the retail automobile market as segmented
by dealer cost, with cars competing within, but not between, cost segments, Within each
segment, dealers compete by negotiating “prices” that are actually markups over dealer cost.
23 Among the recent academic works on the automobile industry are Berry, Levinsohn, and Pakm (1995)
and Goldberg (1995, 1996). Bresnahan and Rei= (1985) study dealer markups in the automobile market;
this is probably the most comparable study to ours.
24 The six versions of the Ford ficort are the 2-door hatchbwk, LX 2-door hatchback, LX 4-door hatchback,
GT 2-door hatchback, LX 4-door sedan, and LX 4door wagon. We describe below our method of choming
a single version to reprment the model.
25Since dealer cost is common knowledge, it is best to use the markup as the relevant price
variable. Then, dealer cost can be used as a proxy for the market segment. 25
An optimal data set would include transaction prices for every vehicle, but such a data set
was not available to us. Instead, we use published estimates of “target prices” calculated by
The Complete Car Cost Guide (1994). These target prices are designed to give consumers
an estimate of the price that they would actually have to pay for the cm. It is based on a
proprietary formula that takes into account typical dealer practices and supply and demand
conditions in the market. 26
The two price proxies that we use are mmkup variables derived from the published target
prices and dealer costs.
(A) The target markup, M,, given by
Mi = TPi – DCa,
where Mi = the markup on model z, TPi is the target prim for model i, as
Complete Car Cost Guide, DCi is the dealer cost for model i (from the same







The costs and target prices we use are those for the least expensive car of its model type.
This is not a terribly restrictive method; although markups do differ across versions of the
same model, the markup rat io is relatively constant. 27
Quantity - Cars sold in the United States, in thousands. (Source: Ward’s Automotive
Yearbook 1994-95 (1994)).
Quality - Ratings from Auto Test (1994). Total ratings (out of a m=imum of 190) are
the sum of individual ratings in nineteen categories, each of which is ~aded from one to
25 D~lers will also sometime receive rebates from manufacturers for each sale. Th~e rebat= are usually
about one to two percent of the dealer cost. Unfortunately, the rebates may vary throughout the year, and
we do not have reliable data on them for our sample. We discuss below the po~ible bias from this omission.
26 Private communication with the publisher.
27 For the s~ versions of the Ford &cofi, the dealer cost ranges from $8,465 to $11,436, the target Price
from $9,000 to $12,172, the markup from $535 to $736, and the markup ratio from .063 to .064. In each
case, the lower bound is given by the 2-door hatchback (the version that we use to represent the model) and
the upper bound is given by the GT 2-door hatchback.
26ten 26 These ratings and their index are subjective and cert airily imperfect, but they were
the best data we could find for our purposes.
As we did for mutual funds, we attempt to uncover the cross-sectional relationships among
the variables. In addition to the variables discussed above, we also include dealer cost as a
right-hand side variable in each of our regressions. The aim is to capture any quality effects
afler controlling for the mrrect cost segment of the market. (This was not an issue in our
analysis of mutual funds. ) Otherwise, the tests we do are direct analogues to those of the
previous section.
Table 2 summarizes the findings of regressions 4A, 4B, 5, and 6. 4A and 4B regress the
two price proxies (the markup in 4A and the markup ratio in 4B) on the quality ratings and
dealer cost. In neither case is the coefficient on quality significant. In 4A, the coefficient on
cost is positive and significant. 4B reinforces the evidence of a linear relationship between
dealer cost and markup; it shows that the markup ratio (markup divided by dealer cost) is
not a function of dealer cost. If there is any relationship between quality and the markup
or markup ratio, then it is not captured by our quality proxy, 29
Quantity is regressed on quality and dealer cost in regression 5. The coefficient on quality
is positive and significant. The point estimate is economically significant: a one-point in-
crease in the quality rating is associated with an increase of 3,410 in cars sold – this implies
that more than 30,000 extra cars are sold for a one-standard deviation increase in the quality
variable. By comparison, the median level of sales for our sample was 74,857. As we found
for mutual funds, quantity and quality seem positively correlated.30
28 The categories are acceleration, transmission, braking, steering, ride, handling, driveability, fuel econ-
omy, comfort/convenience, interior room, driving position, instrumentation, controls, visibility, entry/exit,
quietness, cargo space/ leftover, exterior workmanship and interior workmanship, Auto Test (1994) also in-
cludes a category of “value”, but we exclude it from our total due to its reliance on price. Thus, the original
ranking are out of a maximum of 200, and ours are out of a maximum of 190.
29 one weakn~s of using ~timated target pricm rather than real transaction data is that we are unable
to maure the effect of stronger (or weaker) than expected sales on actual pric~. On average, however,
we would hope that salm forcasts and target prices are corrmt, so that our r~ults reflect the planned
price-quantity strateg of dealers,
30 Of course, since these quality ratings are subj~tive, we cannot be sure that they have not been influenced
by the level of sales. In that case, as long as sal~ were autocorrelated, then simultaneous equations’ bias
would affect our r~ults.
27Table 2- Cross-Sectional Relationships among Price, Quality, and Quantity Proxies in the
Market for Automobiles in the U.S.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)











4.20E7 - — .042 .056
(4.31E7)
-1.03E2 - — 86.2 .145
(3.31E3)
.014 -.420 9.37E+3 -818 .301
(.012) (.187) (3.19E+3)
Notes: Table 2 reports the results of OLS regressions involving price, quantity and quality
proxies. The sample includes 1994 model-year data for the 60 different models for which
complete data was available. Hence, there are 60 observations in each regression. Cars
classified as “sports” (as identified by Auto Test (1994)) and “luxury” (cars with DC >
$25, 000) are excluded. Column (1) gives the regression # as it is referred to in the text
of the paper. Column (2) gives the dependent variable for each regression. Columns (3)-
(6) report the coefficients on each included independent variable; standard errors for these
estimates are given in parentheses. RA is the rating, out of 190, for each car (Source:
Auto Test; p = 148,0 = 9); DC is the cost paid by dealers to manufacturers for each
car, in dollars (Source: The Complete Car Cost Guide (1994), p = 14859, is = 4657); M
is the “target” markup over cost, in dollus, according to The Contplet e Car Cost Guide
(p = 946, a = 378); MR is the markup ratio, % ( p = .063, a = .011); SALES are the
tot al sales in the U.S. for each model, in thousands (Source: Ward’s Automotive Yearbook
1994-95 (1994); p = 100, a = 91). Please refer to the text of the paper for discussions of
these variables. Column (7) reports the constant and Column (8) reports the R2 for each
regression.
28We add both price proxies to the right-hand side of regression 6; regressing quantity on
quality, dealer cost, mmkup, and the markup ratio (the analogue of regression 3 in table
1). The coefficients on the markup ratio and on quality are negative and significant and the
coefficient on the markup is positive and significant. If either of the two markup variables is
dropped from the regression (results not reported here), then the coefficient on the remaining
vmiable is positive and significant. This pattern would be expected if there were some aspect
of quality not captured by our rating, but correlated positively with both price and quantity.
“Brand-power”, for example, would not necessarily show up in even a perfect measure of
quality, but muld easily lead to both higher prices and higher quantities .31
Overall, we find no relationship between price and our measure of quality (regressions 4A
and 4B). There is some evidence suggesting that our price proxies are correlated with the
quantity sold, and perhaps also with an expanded concept of “quality” (regression 6). We
find stronger evidence of a positive relationship between quantity and quality (regressions
5 and 6). Whether or not one controls for markup, quantity is signticantly and positively
related to our quality variable, RA.
The evidence for the mutual fund and automobile industries suggests that firms in these
industries reap the rents from being high-quality producers primarily by enjoying higher
sales rather than by ch~ging higher prices (mutual funds) or dealer markups (automobiles).
These industries illustrate well our “quantity versus price” finding for our theoretical model
of the imperfect information case.
6. Conclusion
The models in this paper address the question: “What role does quantity play, as opposed
to price, in clearing a maket whose sellers differ in quality?” The model of section 2 provided
a benchmmk case yielding some straightforward results: the market share of the low-quality
31 Another possibility is that the omission of dealer rebates, discussed in footnote 25, could cause this rmult.
We would expmt dealer rebat= to be higher for slow-selling cars; in this case, markups for slow-selling cars
would be biased downward in our sample (compared to the true markups, which should include the rebate),
and bias us towards finding a positive relationship betw=n price and quantity. This would also bias us
towards finding a positive univariate correlation between price and quality, so evidence for the absence of
such a relationship in regr~ions 4A and 4B is strengthened.
29seller increased with its own quality, but was always lower than the market share of the high-
quality seller. Section 3 added convex costs of production into the model and found that the
high-quality seller sometimes chooses to accept a smaller market share than its counterpart
in order to set a far higher price. We also found that the ratio of the market shares was a
smooth function of costs. Section 4 introduced imperfect information into the model and
showed how strategic considerations could cause sellers to set identical prices, effectively
softening price competition. Particularly when qualities are close, prices will be identical
yet relative market shares will be very far apart. Section 5 presented empirical evidence from
two industries, mutual funds and automobiles, that appear to illustrate the phenomenon of
“quantity clearing the market”. In both cases, proxies for quality are highly correlated with
the quantity sold, and show little relation with proxies for the price or markup.
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328. Appendix
8.1 Solution with Many Firms: Extension to Section 2
For the case of perfect information and no costs of production, consider an industry with
M firms, indexed by their respective qualities 0~. We arbitrarily order these qualities from
highest to lowest as @l, 02, .... 13~, and we assume that this ordering is strict. Firms set prices
sequent ially in order of
lowest-quality firm sets
2.
We solve the model
quality, so that the highest-quality firm sets its price first and the
its price last. Consumers’ preferences are distributed as in section
backwmds, beginning with the consumer’s problem. The optimal
decision rule for the consumer will be
(A) Buy from firm m if
(l)~~v- Pm ~ Omv- P. for alln= 1,... rrk- 1;
(2)@~v–P~ > O.V– P. for alln=m+l,...A4; and
(3)1. + emu – Pm >1..
(B) Do not buy if JV+Onv– P~ < IV for allm= I,... )M,
Conditions (A. 1) and (A. 2) ensure that a consumer who is indifferent between two prod-
ucts always buys the one of higher quality. This optimal decision rule will lead to a segmented
mmket. To see why, consider two consumers indexed by their valuations of v and w, with
w > v. One can easily verify that if u buys from firm m, then w would never buy from any
firm n < m. This greatly simplifies our problem, as each firm (except for firms 1 and M)




om_~ – em – 6’* – em+l ) (32)
It follows that each firm
m does not set a price of O,
will have positive market share in equilibrium. As long as firm
firm m + 1 could also guarantee itself a positive market share
and thus posit ive profits. Therefore, no firm would ever set a price of O, and the positive
33market share equilibrium is established. We are now ready to solve the game.











This optimal solution can then be substituted into the profit function of firm M – 1,
which is then solved and substituted into the profit function of firms M — 2,. . . . The general
form of the profit function for firm ?n, m = 2,.,., M – 1 is
Pm. ~– Pm
m=(@_l_@m - 7r :’”: ;~+’ )Pm.
m m m+ 1
The profit of firm 1 is written the same as in the duopoly case:
(35)
(36)
where P2 would be a function of @l, 62, ...dM.
Computing the equilibrium is tedious but not difficult. The results yield similar intuition
to the duopoly case. We solved a 5-firm game as an example. Figure 8 shows the equilibrium
quantities of this game as a function of OS, the parameter allowed to vary, drawn for the
special case of 191= 1, 02 = .8, 04 = .4, and 135= .2. The range for 03 is between .4 and .8,
the levels of 64 and 02, respectively. When 03 = .4, then firm 3 will be engaged in ruinous
competition with firm 4, driving both their prices and profits down to zero. In this case,
firm 5 would also be driven out of business in the limit. As OSrises, firm 3 increases its
market share at the expense of its two closest neighbors, Finally, as 03 approaches ,8, firm
3 begins to engage in more ruinous competition with firm 2; in the limit, both firms’ prices
and profits fall to zero, and they split all the market not taken by firm 1. At this limit, firms
4 and 5 are driven from the market.
34Figure 8- Market Share of each Seller in a Five-Firm Oligopoly as a Function
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8.2 Solution with Convex Costs: Model from Section 3















35where PL will be replaced by its optimal value given in (38). We obtain
Substituting into (38) we obtain
Solving for r yields
Result 2’ of section 3 is that & > 0 and ~ < 0. We can confirm these results by
directly evaluating the derivatives:
since we know that @H > 6L, we can eliminate many of these terms and write
(41)
Similarly, we evaluate
since @H > 6L we can eliminate many terms for an inequality result, namely
(42)
Result 2’ is established.
8.3 Solution with Imperfect Information: Proof of Proposition 1
from Section 4
To prove this proposition, as well as to draw the figures of section 4, we first need to solve
36for five expressions:
(1) Tfi - Separating
(2) n: - Separating
profits for H if we ignore the constraint in (27).
profits for H when the constraint in (27) binds exactly.
(3) As - The minimum level of A for which the constraint in (27) holds.
(4) mfi - Pooling profits for H if we ignore the constraint in (28).
(5) & - Pooling profits for H when the constraint in (28) binds exactly.
After solving for these five expressions, we are able to compare H’s pooling and separating
profits for all levels of A and a, and show that when the conditions of the proposition are






subject to PH ~
a(l +a) +4A(1 – a) .







The relevant second-order conditions hold here, so






whenever the constraint binds, it will
– 5Aa + Aa2)
(46) n
(~’ + ~ + 4A - 4Aa)’ ‘
,––,
where n; refers to profits for the high-quality producer in the separating equilibrium when
the constraint binds. The constraint will bind when
37~= 2Ap(l + a)









subject to PH <
a(l + a) + 4A(1 – a)
When the constraint does not bind, the solution is
~H= (a+l)(2-A)p
4(1 – az – Aa + AQ!2) ‘
and pooling profits will be
(2- A)2(a+l)~
‘L = 16(1 – Q2 – Aa + Aa2) “






F A@(a + 1)(2a2 +20+ 4A – 9Aa + 3Aa2 – 4J2 + 8A2a – 4A2a2)
TH = (52)
(az + a + 4A - 4Aa)2
Comparing Separating and Pooling Profits
We need to show that pooling profits are always larger than separating profits whenever
we have both Q ~ .55 and A > ~. Since A = ~ is exactly the point at which separating
profits become constrained, and since n~ ~ Ti, it will suffice to show that n~ > T; for the
seta~.55rl A>*. From (46) and (52), we have TZ > n} if and only if








This will hold for ~ ~ 1 (and, thus, for all possible A) when
a+az
4–8a+4a2
>1- a >.54327. (54)
Thus, whenever a > .54327, we will haver~ > ~~ Y ~, and, a fortiori V ~ > ~.
(Thus, ourcondition intheproof that a>.55is slightly stronger than wenwd.) n —
Section 4 contains several figures that can help give some intuition for this result.
We can also use this result to verify Result 2“. At a = .5, A = 1, we have the constraint
bind for sepaating profits, and th~e constrained separating profits ae larger than pooling
profits: n~ = Tk > x%. Thus, we have a separating equilibrium at this point, with prices
(calculated born (23) and (26)) of P~ = .54545 and P~ = .13636. Solving for the quantities
sold by each firm yields T = 3.
39